This paper allows for the effect of taxation in the econometric model for the analysis of exploration and production policies of "price taking suppliers" recently proposed in Pesaran( 1990) .
1JNTRODUCTION
In a recent paper H. Pesaran (1990) has developed an econometric model for the analysis of the exploration and extraction policies of "price taking" suppliers of oil and has applied it to the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) . The model takes explicit account of the process of oil discovery and of the intertemporal nature of the exploration and production decisions. Estimation of the model over the period 1978( 1)-1986(4) produces an important trade-off between statistical fit and the plausibility of the estimates. The use of rational expectations delivers statistically significant results with estimates of the structural parameters that have the theoretically expected signs, but average marginal extraction costs over the sample take an implausibly high value of over $100 and the "shadow price" of oil in the ground is not always positive. Sensitivity analysis reveals that one important reason for the implausibly high average estimate of the marginal extraction cost is the low estimate obtained for the intertemporal discount rate: the most plausible estimates for the marginal extraction costs are obtained by setting the discount rate to infinity, i.e. by assuming that the future is irrelevant to the exploration and production decisions of the firm. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the sensitivity of this result to the inclusion of taxation in an intertemporal model of exploration and production of North Sea oil.
The necessary conditions to omit taxation from an economic and econometric model are that the tax system is neutral and stable. A system can be considered neutral if it does not affect the decision of economic agents. A non-neutral tax system has to be explicitly modelled because, by definition, it affects firms' decisions with respect to exploration, development and production activities. A tax system is unstable if its characteristics change from those which decision-makers could have known at the time their decisions were made. Such changes should be reflected in modifications of the optimal intertemporal path of the decision variables. The first section of the paper is devoted to a description of the North Sea oil tax-system in the period 1978-86 in order to assess its neutrality and stability. In the second section tax-dependent supply and exploration equations are derived from an intertemporal optimization framework. The third section is devoted to the estimation of a two-equation econometric model.
THE UKCS OIL FISCAL REGIME
The United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) oil fiscal regime was introduced by the Oil Taxation Act in 1975 and operates essentially in three stages (Mabro et.al.(1986) ):
-the first stage is the payment of a royalty based on the gross field revenues. The royalty can be paid in cash or in kind and it was fixed at 12.5% of the revenue over the entire sample periodl.
-the second stage is the Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT).
The PRT is assessed on a field by field basis : around each field a notional "ring fence" prevents external influences affecting the PRT bill paid. In practice a company has as many PRT assessments as it has shares in different fields and company losses in one field cannot be set against profit in other fields.
The PRT is assessed on total revenue, royalties and allowable expenditure plus an uplift are deductible, in addition there are an oil allowance and a safeguard. Allowable expenditure includes all the expenditure incurred in discovering a field and producing oil from it. Costs incurred in exploration and development are increased by the amount of an uplift which was originally set at 75% and reduced to 35% in 1979; from the start of 1981 a cut-off date is calculated as being the end of the period in which the field reaches payback (i.e. when the cumulative revenues of a field exceed the cumulative outgoings). Before 1979 the oil allowance was a deduction from profits of 500,000 tonnes of oil for each six-month period up to a cumulative maximum of 10 million tonnes , from 1979 onwards 250,000 tonnes are allowed for each period with a maximum cumulative allowance of 5 million tonnes.
The safeguard is a limitation on PRT that is restricted to be no more than the 80% of the amount by which the adjusted profits (assessable profits plus oil allowances and capital allowances) exceed 15% of the accumulated capital expenditure at the end of the period.
The PRT rate has varied considerably over the sample period, in the range 45.% -75%. (figure 1) lsome modifications in the payment of the royalty occurred from 1983 onward but they affected only new fields. It is also difficult to model them explicitly in the case of aggregate production decisions With the Finance Act of 1983 relevant changes in PRT have been introduced which apply only to new projects. The ratio of the modification was to keep intact the revenues from existing fields, simultaneously offering incentives to the development of new fields. Three major changes were introduced in the taxation of new fields : the oil allowance was doubled, an exemption from the payment of royalty was fully granted, and the ring fence was partially lifted for exploration and appraisal costs incurred after March 1983 . In March 1987 the Cross Field Allowance for new fields extended the facilitations to development and the development costs of a new oil field were allowed to be offset against the PRT liability on other existing fields.
The 1981 Budget introduced a Supplementary Petroleum Duty (SPD) in addition to PRT.
The new tax was charged at a rate of 20% of gross production revenue from each field less an allowance of 1 million tonnes per annum. It was calculated on a field by field basis and it was deductible in calculating profits liable to both PRT and Corporation Taxes.
At the end of 1982 SPD was succeeded by the Advance Petroleum Revenue Tax (APRT) which is essentially a method of collecting PRT liability in advance. APRT was originally calculated the same way as SPD but it was not deductible before PRT and corporation taxes were calculated, although the extent to which APRT was paid had the effect of reducing subsequent PRT bills accordingly.
Also the rate of APRT varied within the sample (figure 2) and the tax was phased out from 1983 onwards. The third stage in the oil taxation system is the corporation tax (CT). CT is levied on the operating company and not on individual fields, both the royalties and the PRT are deductible from the CT. The CT rate over the sample is plotted in fig.4 .
On the basis of this brief description of the UKCS tax-system we can now discuss its neutrality and stability.
As far as neutrality is concerned we notice that one of the main features of the tax-system is the lack of progressivity. The tax rates are constant, and there are very few elements of progressivity in the tax-base, the most noticeable being the oil allowance. Leaving aside equity considerations, the absence of a progressive tax system has three major implications [Clunies-Ross( 1982) , Hann-Rowland( 1986) 
for a given tax revenue target a progressive tax system is less likely to affect projects in such a way that development decisions are jeopardized: the impact of a progressive t ax-system on companies earning marginal profits is negligible. a progressive tax system w i l l not magnify the impact of other imperfections in the tax-system. The non-progressivity of the tax system will render severe a reduction of the marginal field profitability caused by a mistaken inclusion of part of the normal profits in the tax-base. a non-progressive tax-system causes higher variability of post tax profits than a progressive one. Given the variability of oil price, the risk associated with the development of marginal fields is higher when the tax-system is not progressive.
iii)
We can conclude that the lack of progressivity of the tax-system is a strong reason to consider it as non-neutral.
Another reason for non-neutrality resides in the relation between the tax-system and risk in the exploratory and development activity. Exploration and development in the North Sea are risky activities because of the possibility of drilling dry holes, the difficulty of delineate deposits, the problem of estimating reserves, and the unknown geology of the areas investigated. The ring-fence provision, which precludes setting losses in any fields against profit obtained by the same company from other fields, does not give any premium to the risk. The fact that the risk is entirely born by a risk-averse taxpayer increases the non-neutrality of the taxes.
Moving to stability, we notice immediately that the absence of progressivity is in itself a potential cause of instability of the tax-system : in fact only in a progressive tax system price rises would automatically generate an increase in tax revenue without any need for modifications of the system's rates.
The empirical evidence shows that the time span between the date of proposal and the date of implementation of modifications in the tax system ranges from a minimum of -2 months (PRT was proposed in the March 1975 budget, but put into effect from January 1975 ) to a maximum of 2 years (See Hann and Rowland[1986] pp.13-14).
Since the development lag (the time-span between the discovery and the production start-up dates) ranges from three years and ten months to twelve years [ See Mabro et al.[l986] table S3 page 3201 it follows that all the changes in the tax system must be considered as unknown at the time exploration and output decisions are taken. From figures 1 4 we can see that there has been a great deal of variation in the tax parameters, and the relevant tax parameters are not only unknown to the firm but also unpredictable, as stated earlier, to both the UK Offshore Operators Association and BRINDEX (the association of about forty smaller oil companies) (Clunies Ross[1982] ).
The reason for the unpredictability is ascribed by some economists (Hann [1985] ) to the fact that the reform in oil taxation is driven more by politicd and bureaucratic pressures than by economic factors predictable by firms.
We can therefore conclude that there is no evidence of stability and neutrality in the UXCS tax system and the inclusion of taxation in a model of exploration and production of North Sea Oil in the UKCS is a task of some relevance.
AN INTERTEMPORAL MODEL OF EXPLORATION AND EXTRACTION WITH TAXATION
To model exploration and extraction in the UKCS we assume that producers axe risk neutral and decide on the rates of extraction qt,qt+l,... and the rates of exploratory efforts, ..., by maximizing the discounted future streams of profits conditional on the information set Rt -l,which includes the taxation system in force at time t-1. Therefore the desired values for extraction and production are found by solving the intertemporal optimization problem "t, "t+l where O<p<l is the discount factor and Ilt is the producer profit defined as follows which can be rewritten as Several comments on the profit function are in order.
The proposed parameterization of the function is a general specification which embeds all the features of the tax system in the sample period. The switches from one regime to the other are captured by the tax parameters, which can be considered as dummies set to zero when the tax is not applied and set to the appropriate value when the tax is charged.
In the net profit function (2)
[ptq, -C(qt,Rt_,) -wtxt] is the profit before taxes, C(qt,Rt-l) is a convex function capturing the cost of development and extraction. C(qt,Rt-l) varies positively with the rate of extraction and negatively with the level of remaining proven reserve$.
(Tlt+T4t)ptqt captures the effect of the royalty payment and of the SPD (when the SPD is on), which are both levied on the gross field revenues and represents the first stage of the Oil Taxation System (OTS) previously discussed. The second stage of the OTS is captured by the following expression T2tiPtPt -C(qt,RtJ -UPtWtXt +It+ 7-4t)Ptqtl which represents the PRT bill : royalties and SPD are deduced from gross revenues together with production costs and exploration costs augmented by the uplift.
Finally, in the third stage of the OTS, the Corporation Tax is assessed as follows corporation tax bill. We notice that, since APRT it is a way of collecting PRT in advance, its effect is captured by the PRT parameter. Lastly it has to be said that the aggregate nature of the data does not allow the consideration of field allowances, whose effect can be included only when a field by field disaggregation is implemented.
To summarize we can state that the impact of the tax system in our model is captured by the three variables alt, ~i~, a3t, where alt is a measure of the reduction in the marginal revenue due to taxation (the smaller alt the larger the difference between pre-tax and post-tax revenue), while ~i~ and are measures of the reduction in the marginal extraction cost and in the marginal exploration cost due to allowances in the tax system (the smaller ~i~ and a3t the higher the allowance). By plotting over the sample period ( fig.5 ) we notice immediately a turning point in 1983, in fact from 1983 onward the wedge between pre-tax profits and post-tax profits has been decreasing uniformly.
In optimizing the firm faces the following constraints:
where dt denotes the addition to proven reserves during period t-1 to t from new discoveries, and et the revisions/extensions to previously discovered reserves, Xt represents the level of cumulative exploratory effort at time t. To determine dt we follow, as in Pesaran( 1990) , a version of the Kaufman( 1975) model and specify that dt = F(x t' X t-l)"t
where pt is assumed to satisfy the orthogonality condition
The information set at time t-1 is assumed to contain observations on at least the current and past values of q, x and past values of R,w, p and all the tax parameters.
The following conditions are satisfied : a 2 F 2 xt-la x t 8Ft / axt >o,
Therefore the marginal product of exploratory effort should be positive but diminishing, and there is a discovery decline phenomenon: as exploration proceeds the effects of reserves exhaustion dominates the influence of the accumulation of geological knowledge.
The Eder Equations
Given price cost and tax parameter expectations Pt+k' E(pt+kl E(wt+kl relations completely define the decision environment of the firm. Conditions (8a)-(8f) are non linear but they can be transformed to derive exploration and extraction rules that can be consistently estimated. If we focus on current decision variables qt and xt and rewrite relations (8a)-(8f) for T = 0 we have Equation (sa) gives an expression for the expected shadow price of oil in the ground; it is noticeable that both the expected well-head price and the expected marginal extraction cost are affected by the tax system. Equation (9b) gives the intertemporal condition for the extraction of oil over time. Equations (9c) and (9d) give the necessary conditions for the determination of the optimum level of exploration. Again it is noticeable that the expected return from exploration, defined by the right hand side of (9c) is affected by the tax system.
a)The Production equation
We can derive an output equation from condition (9a)-(9d) by eliminating all the unobservables.
From (sa) we have
% + l and, assuming expectations are formed consistently yields Substituting this result in (9b) and using (sa) to eliminate Et -l(At), we obtain
This equation does not depend on the Lagrange multipliers and, for a given specification of the extraction cost function, it can be consistently estimated.
The following non-linear form [Pesaran( 1990) ] for the extraction cost function is adopted where et represents unobserved random shocks to marginal extraction cost, which are assumed to be orthogonal to the information set Rt-l, all the parameters in the cost function are expected to be positive except for S1 which could be negative so long as where <it+k satisfies the orthogonality property E( {it+k I Ot-l)= 0
We notice that, although the changes in the tax parameters are usually announced in the Budget, we still mantain the possibility of forecasting errors in predicting future tax parameters, generated by the length of the development lag.
Our second alternative for expectations formation is constituted by an adaptive expectations scheme for price combined with a rational expectations scheme for the tax parameters.
We have under this alternative we consider the possibility of a backward looking behaviour by agents in the formation of price expectations, possibly justified by the high volatility of oil prices within the sample period. However we do not remove the hypothesis of rational expectations on the tax parameters because the relaxations of this hypothesis would have the implication that announcements made at time t-1 of future modifications in the tax parameters are ignored by the representative firm.
Summarizing, we will consider the two following empirical alternatives for the supply equation " 2 t + l "2 t + l "2 t "2 t Pt+ll +b3zt-l( qt+l) + b4zt-1( ht+l) + 5 t where satisfies the orthogonality conditions E( elt I 0.
(ii) Mixed Adaptive and Rational Expectations model " 2 t + l " 2 t + l "2 t "2 t
Ek2t I fl,-,)=o
As far as estimation is concerned we notice that both elt and c2t are orthogonal to the information set Rt -1, equations (16) and (17) can be therefore consistently estimated by implementing the "Error in variables" method [McCallum( 1976) ] using instruments dated t-2 or earlier, assuming, of course, that the parameters are in fact identified.
b) The Exploration Equation
The first step to generate an estimable exploration equation is to combine (9c) and (9d) in the following condition
Then we assume that the discovery function takes the form advocated by Uhler (1976 p.79) in his empirical analysis of oil and gas discovery in the province of Alberta *(xt,Xt-1) = Ax; exp(b1Xt-1-b2Xt-1) (18) for positive values of A,bl and b2 and for O<p<l the function satisfies all the required properties, in particular the threshold value for the cumulative exploratory effort, after which we have the discovery decline phenomenon, is given by Xm= b1/2b2.
Even a discovery function like (18) produces a highly non linear functional form in the general case. However if we focus on the simple case @= 0 we have the following relation for the desired rate of exploration which represents the shadow price of oil in the ground and whose value is determined by using the parameter estimates from the production equation.
The estimable equation will then be
where ,under the REH, the disturbances ut 0.
4.THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our empirical analysis will focus on the sample period 1978(1)-1986(4) to allow direct comparability with the results obtained by Pesaran( 1990) .
Supply Equation
In order to estimate the Rational Expectations version of the supply equation we have to take in account the possible correlation between the composite disturbance in equation (16) and the regressors. Under the rational expectations hypothesis tlt is orthogonal to the information set available at time t-1, therefore the Error in Variables procedure [McCallum(1976) ] can be implemented by using instruments dated t-1 or earlier? The
Non-Linear Two Stage Least Squares method [Gallant(1987) ch.61 allows us to model the non-hearity in parameters of equation (17) quarter and zero elsewhere . The instrumental variables used are seasonal dummies, qt -2, Pt-2' h t-2' Rt-2' Rt-2* 2 Rt-2qt-2, "lt-2'"2t-2~*"1t-2' '3t-2, which all satisfy the orthogonality condition. The estimates of the structural parameters are reported in table 1 together with the heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. All the estimates have the expected signs although bl,b2,b3 are poorly determined and bl is very far from being significant.In the reported specification has been set to zero but the uncertainty on S2 and i $ remains high. The point estimate of the discount factor p is outside the admissible range, although the hypothesis that ,8=.9 cannot be rejected statistically. The adaptive expectations equation fits worse than the REH version and the t-statistics on all the parameters estimates are lower. As in Besaran(l990) we find heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals, more importantly the marginal extraction costs implied by the estimated parameters in equation (16) and (17), plotted in figure 7, although smaller than those obtained in the model without taxation, are still too high to be taken seriously.
As in Pesaran(l990), we find empirically a negative relation between the discount factor and plausibility of the marginal extraction cost. We therefore re-estimated the two alternative models under the hypothesis that @=O. The results are reported in table 2. We notice that both the serial correlation and the heteroscedasticity problems disappear. The REH equation From the economic point of view the result of a zero discount factor can be justified as an outcome of the high degree of uncertainty, generated both by price instability and the unpredictability of a non-stable and non-neutral tax-system: in a continuously changing environment the representative firm has a very short time-horizon in choosing the determinants of its productions because predictions more than one-period ahead are not reliable. In the context of the North Sea these economic considerations are strenghtened by the technical cost of production: once a platform has been installed the high rate depreciation of capital and the prospective final cost of removal are important technical factors in reducing the sensitivity of production to future, highly unpredictable, economic factors. On the basis of this evidence the first item on the research agenda is the incorporation of a "development stage" in the optimization framework.
The separation of overall cost function C(q t ,R t-1 )in its two components,operating costs and development cost, and including the rate of development in the decision variables of the firms will allow the model to capture explicitly the dependence of the production stage on the development stage.
The Exploration Equation
In our theoretical model exploration is strictly linked to production through the shadow price of oil in the ground. The p r e t a x and post-tax shadow prices of oil in the ground are plotted in figure 9 . We notice that the pre-tax shadow price of oil in the ground is always positive while the post-tax price of oil in the ground becomes negative for the four quarters . . The figures in () are the White's(1982) heteroscedasticity-consistent estimates adjusted for the degrees of freedom, CT is the estimated standard error of the regression, /L is the mean of the dependent variable X (4), XFF(l), XN(2), XH( 1) are diagnostic statistics distributed approlcimately as chi-squared variables (with the degrees of freedom reported in parentheses) for tests for residual serial correlation (up to the fourth order), functional misspecification form, non-normal errors and heteroscedasticity respectively. See Pesaran and Pesaran ( 1989) . . The figures in () are the White's(1982) heteroscedasticity-onsistent estimates adjusted for the degrees of freedom, 0 is the estimated standard error of the regression, p is the mean of the dependent variable Xsc(4), XFF( l), XN(2), XH(l) are diagnostic statistics distributed approximately as chi-squared variables (with the degrees of freedom reported in parentheses) for tests for residual serial correlation (up to the fourth order), functional misspecification form, non-normal errors and heteroscedasticity respectively. Sargan X is a test for the validity of instruments (degrees of freedom within brackets). See Pesaran and Pesaran( 1989) 2 2 2 2 2 h R 9t-11 9t-21 pt-2' t-2, t-2' * Estimation by Instrumental Variables computed using seasonal dummies, 2 Rt-21 Rt-2%-21 "1t-2'a2t-21A 5t-21 A Qit-2 as instruments. 
